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CTF-SVip首先先看题目代码 // pragma solidity 0.4.24; //这是原来的版本，很奇怪不知道为啥无法在foundry编译，所以换成以下版本pragma solidity ^0.8.13;contract SVip { // 一个地址记录一个分数 mapping(address => uint) public points; // 查看某地址是不是超级VIP mapping(address => bool) public isSuperVip; uint256 public numOfFree; // 用户成为超级VIP需要999分数 function promotionSVip() public { require(points[msg.sender] >= 999, "Sorry, you don't have enough points"); isSuperVip[msg.sender] = true;  ...

CTF-TrusterLenderPool这个题很经典。又是假装还款的存在 有用到swap交换，而且还是address(this)来检查token0的地址，所以就更加可以用来假装还款了 题目源码： // SPDX-License-Identifier: MITpragma solidity ^0.8.0;import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";import "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol";import "@openzeppelin/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol";contract Cert is IERC20 { mapping(address => uint256) private _balances; mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) private ...

一SummaryDue to the lack of access control on the stopFunding function, anyone can monitor the blockchain, identify a program with an active funding process, and maliciously call the stopFunding function to stop the program, resulting in improper fund allocation.I know you have already described ithttps://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-11-superfluid-locking-contract-HeYuan-33?tab=readme-ov-file#q-please-discuss-any-design-choices-you-madeBut can you be sure that the participant is not an attacker ...

一SummaryThere is no verification of the incentives recipient, which allows anyone to impersonate other borrowers and claim their incentives. Root CauseVulnerable code: 2024-11-debita-finance-v3-HeYuan-33/Debita-V3-Contracts/contracts/DebitaIncentives.sol Line 203 in 1465ba6 IERC20(token).transfer(msg.sender, amountToClaim); Using msg.sender to send rewards to the caller without performing a check allows an attacker to impersonate a borrower and claim their incentives . Additiona ...

攻击介绍Palmswap由于其蹩脚的业务逻辑，导致了价格被黑客操控，导致被黑客盗取了大约$900K 攻击分析我们通过phalcon来分析。 通过调用栈发现，攻击者先贷了3,000,000的USDT，然后质押1,000,000的USDT来获得大约996,324的PLP，然后用剩下的2,000,000的USDT，去购买了USDP，然后攻击者销毁了持有的所有的PLP，但得到了大约1,947,570的USTD。最后卖出USDP,大约得到1,947,570的USDT。 显然，攻击者在通过购买USDP操纵了PLP的价格。 function getPrice(bool _maximise) external view returns (uint256) { uint256 aum = getAum(_maximise); uint256 supply = IERC20Upgradeable(plp).totalSupply(); return (aum * PLP_PRECISION) / supply; } funct ...

题目源代码： // SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSEDpragma solidity ^0.8.13;contract Factorial { bool public solved = false; function run(uint256 number) internal view returns (uint256) { uint256 res = 1; for (uint256 index = 0; index < number; index++) { (, bytes memory data) = msg.sender.staticcall(abi.encodeWithSignature("factorial(uint256)", number)); res = res * abi.decode(data, (uint256)); } return res; &# ...

CTF-BabyOtter题目源代码： // SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSEDpragma solidity ^0.8.13;contract BabyOtter { bool public solved = false; function solve(uint x) public { unchecked { assert(x * 0x1337 == 1); } solved = true; }} 这个题，有个unchecked 它是一个不对溢出进行的一个检查unchecked 是一个特殊的关键字，表示在代码块中进行运算时不进行溢出检查。这意味着即使在某些情况下会发生溢出，也不会触发 Solidity 默认的溢出检查错误。 那么就很容易想到溢出来解决这个题了攻击代码： // SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSEDpragma solidity ^0.8.13;interfa ...

CTF-AdultOtter题目源代码： // SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSEDpragma solidity ^0.8.13;contract AdultOtter { bool public solved = false; function pwn(uint[16] memory code) public { uint[16] memory a; uint[16] memory b; for (uint i = 0; i < 16; i++) { assert(1337 * i < code[i] && code[i] < 1337 * (i + 1)); } for (uint i = 0; i < 16; i++) { a[i] = i**i * code[i]; } for (uint i = 1; i < 16; i++) ...

一SummaryIf the admin records the investment using the investment token instead of the stablecoin, it will lead to an error. Root CauseVulnerable code: 2024-11-vvv-exchange-update-HeYuan-33/vvv-platform-smart-contracts/contracts/vc/VVVVCInvestmentLedger.sol Lines 268 to 277 in c1e47db for (uint256 i = 0; i < _kycAddresses.length; i++) { address kycAddress = _kycAddresses[i]; uint256 investmentRound = _investmentRounds[i]; uint256 amountToInvest = _amountsTo ...

攻击介绍2023年7月11日，Arbitrum链上的Rodeo Finance: Pool由于价格预言机操纵，而被黑客盗取了472 ETH。 攻击分析攻击者利用了预言机的缺陷控制了unshETH与ETH之间的兑换比率,预言机使用 ETH 与 unshETH 的准备金比率来检查价格。同时攻击者能够通过具有未配置策略地址的 earn 函数强制平台将 USDC 兑换为 unshETH。由于价格预言机存在缺陷，滑点控制无法生效。(具体可见Meth为0x7b37c42b的交易)。 function earn(address usr, address pol, uint256 str, uint256 amt, uint256 bor, bytes calldata dat) external loop returns (uint256){ if (status < S_LIVE) revert WrongStatus(); if (!pools[pol]) revert InvalidPool(); if (strategies[str] == addres ...